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5 China’s administrative 
hierarchy
The balance of power and winners 
and losers within China’s levels of 
government
John A. Donaldson1
The China that Chairman Mao Zedong ruled was primarily agrarian. Mao’s 
party, consistent with the ideas of Lenin on which it was partially based, pursued 
planned industrialization by promoting state- owned manufacturing. This 
endeavor involved all sectors of society in the push to catch up with the West – 
even to the point of imploring rural residents to smelt steel in backyard fur-
naces. These efforts showed some success – by 1978 manufacturing’s share of 
GDP had risen from the 28 percent it held in 1949. Yet even after three 
decades, manufacturing still represented less than half of GDP, while the coun-
try’s population remained more than 80 percent rural. Moreover, China’s future 
prospects were not augmented, but instead bogged down, by state- managed 
industries that were almost universally outdated and woefully inefficient. If 
China were to succeed at urbanization and industrialization, fundamental 
changes would be needed. One of these necessary systemic changes was a rede-
sign of the administrative hierarchy that had, up to that point, channeled power 
from Beijing to the provinces through prefectural dispatch offices, to rural coun-
ties and townships, and down to every rural corner of China.
 Subsequently, gradual changes in China’s administrative hierarchy not only 
profoundly altered, but were also shaped by, the country’s burgeoning cities that 
subsequently dominated China’s economic, political, and social landscape. By the 
time President Jiang Zemin, Deng Xiaoping’s successor, formally relinquished 
most posts in 2002, the administrative hierarchy that had served Mao well was 
virtually unrecognizable. The central government no longer dictated policy down 
the hierarchy, but instead shared power with the much more powerful provinces. 
The provinces, in turn, had to contend with increasingly formidable prefecture- 
level urban municipalities. Provincial dispatch offices no longer, these formally 
subordinate prefecture- level municipalities drove the process of transforming 
what had formerly been rural counties into subordinate urban districts. In doing 
so, these municipal governments expanded their own influence, as well as the 
scope and scale of China’s urbanization. Meanwhile, other rural counties were 
reclassified as county- level cities, helping them to further promote urbanization. 
Both these changes at the county level profoundly altered the nature and opera-
tion of formerly rural towns and townships, which soon also acted as agents of 
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urbanization. Thus the administrative hierarchy was not dissimilar formally to 
that which Mao had known, but still had altered greatly in terms of the numbers 
of each type of local government, as well as these local governments’ functions 
and authority (as described in greater detail later).
 This widespread rural- to-urban shift, felt throughout China’s territory and in 
the power centers that governed it, exacerbated the growing inequality between 
urban and rural areas, catalyzed a massive loss of farmland, and displaced hun-
dreds of millions of rural migrants – weighty problems that were worsened by 
China’s woefully inadequate social welfare system. The urbanization excesses of 
the Jiang era were moderated to some extent during the subsequent Hu Jintao 
administration, which sought to construct a “new socialist countryside” and 
further empower the provinces, giving them more control over rural counties at 
the expense of the cities. Meanwhile, new and renewed tools of power helped 
the center reclaim some power in an attempt to curb some of the excesses of 
decentralization. Overall, though, the gains for the countryside under Hu were 
perhaps modest and certainly short- lived. While the current administration of Xi 
Jinping has continued and redoubled Hu’s efforts to recentralize power, it also 
has deepened and hastened China’s efforts at urbanization. All this has created 
new and fundamental challenges to China’s administrative hierarchy.
What issues are at stake under China’s administrative 
hierarchy?
As China’s policy direction has changed, so too have its administrative levels, 
with urbanization and industrialization affecting every level in China’s adminis-
trative hierarchy. As power shifts up or down the administrative hierarchy, local 
governments are either constrained to follow central dictates or freed to set and 
implement policies more or less according to their own design. As administra-
tive units are invented, consolidated, or divided, not only do political elites gain 
or lose power, but also the needs and interests of different segments of society 
are privileged or disregarded. Thus the dynamic changes in China’s administra-
tive levels bear upon changes in China’s developmental path, for these govern-
mental levels are both the agents and objects of change.
 In order to rule a country with such a massive population and continental 
size, China’s power had constantly vacillated among different levels of govern-
ment. The tensions in the system have sometimes compelled stronger measures 
that not only shift power up or down the hierarchy, but also alter the hierarchy 
itself. As shown in Table 5.1, different dynasties have, throughout history, 
added or subtracted levels to maintain control and monitor subordinate govern-
ments (Fitzgerald 2002; Zhou 2005). Even in the relatively short history of the 
People’s Republic of China, these levels have not been static. For instance, for a 
five- year period, an additional layer of government, six supra- provincial regions 
known as the Great Administrative Regions (1949–1954), were established as a 
layer between the provinces and the central government (Solinger 1977). Other 
governmental levels established in the first few years of the People’s Republic 
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included the sub- provincial districts as well as government entities that existed 
nationwide between county and township (Zhou 2005).
 Just as adding and subtracting levels helped these dynasties to govern China, 
so too do such changes serve the rulers of the People’s Republic of China. 
During the reform era, the central government’s goal of rapid industrialization 
and urbanization, promoted not through a Mao- era planned economy but 
through active government promotion of market and other forces, required 
additional flexibility in local areas. To achieve the central government’s ambi-
tious reform and development goals, each local government – particularly prov-
inces and counties – needed to be allowed to set (within centrally determined 
boundaries) its own developmental paths and policies. Ultimately, the hierarchy 
itself proved insufficient for such nimble responsiveness. The system that had 
been established for strict central control of an agrarian economy could not be 
adequate for the requirements of a government dedicated to wholesale, market- 
based pursuit of industrialization and urbanization, let alone innovation and dis-
cretion. Given this need for systemic change, how would the administrative 
hierarchy adjust? How do the goals of industrialization and urbanization affect 
the administrative hierarchy? How do changes both within and across the levels 
of hierarchy affect the process of industrialization and urbanization? These ques-
tions lead us to politics – the conflictual processes of determining who gets 
what, when, and how (Lasswell 1936).
 Despite a great deal of research, precise answers to these questions have not 
yet been forthcoming. To be sure, many scholars have established the role of 
local governments in China’s development miracle, particularly in the first few 
decades of the reform period. One major strand of inquiry has argued that the 
rapid growth seen in China, particularly during its early years, was sparked by the 
decentralization of power to local governments, particularly provinces (Shirk 
1993; Heilmann 2008). China’s major reform and development initiatives – the 
establishment of special economic zones, attracting overseas investment and 
establishing joint ventures, reforming agricultural communes, and promoting 
town- and-village enterprises – have worked by means of the forces of decentrali-
zation. While there has been debate about how to characterize this decentraliza-
tion, whether it be via local experimentation (Heilmann 2008), market- preserving 
federalism (Montinola et al. 1995), regionally decentralized authoritarianism 
(Landry 2008), or the creation of incentives for local innovation (Shirk 1993), a 
consensus has emerged that central–local dynamics have been important to 
understanding China’s impressive economic growth.
Table 5.1 Number of levels below the center across the dynastic period
1 Two tiers: Qin, Han, Sui, Early Tang
2 Three tiers: Late Tang, Song, Liao, Jin, Ming, Qing
3 Four tiers: Yuan
Source: Zhou, Qingsheng. 1996. “Interprovincial Resource Transfers in China, 1952–1990.” Inter-
national Journal of Urban and Regional Research 20, No. 4:571–586.
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 As vibrant as this scholarly discussion has been, however, three issues have 
received less systematic attention. First, even during the reform era, China has 
had periods of centralization and decentralization on the one hand, as well as 
overlapping periods during which industrialization and urbanization was 
emphasized or de- emphasized on the other. The interaction between these pol-
icies has received less systematic attention. Second, neither China’s industrializa-
tion and urbanization nor its decentralization or recentralization has been 
wholly positive. China’s economic success, even as it has benefitted many, has 
come at a cost. More work is needed to distinguish the effects of these inter-
twined forces on different segments of China’s society. Third, while the link 
between the degree of administrative decentralization and China’s growth has 
been well established, there has been less work on the reverse – the effect of 
China’s changing economy on its administrative hierarchy. These issues are too 
complex and multifaceted to allow a thorough treatment in a chapter- length 
discussion. This chapter can only begin the process of examining winners and 
losers as economic and administrative changes have affected each other through-
out these distinctly different periods of China’s reform era.
Changes in the administrative hierarchy since 1978
In order to understand the political process that affects the aforementioned two-
 way interaction – between the administrative hierarchy on the one hand and 
industrialization and urbanization on the other – this chapter focuses on two 
variables that have changed over the course of the reform period (see Table 
5.2). The next section focuses on the ebb and flow of these changes, dividing 
the reform period into three distinct phases, the first being one of decentraliza-
tion and intense policy focus on industrialization and urbanization (roughly 
1978 to the mid- 1990s), and the second being one of recentralization and a 
softening of the focus on industrialization and urbanization seen during the first 
period (roughly the mid- 1990s to 2011). The dividing line between the first 
two phases is not clear- cut, as will be seen in the discussion on specific changes 
in the administrative hierarchy. The third phase has seen the Xi Jinping adminis-
tration adopt the centralizing tendencies of the second phase, but also take on 
the urbanization thrust of the first phase – and bring both of these to a new 
Table 5.2 Charting the phases of centralization/decentralization and policy focus
Flow of power
Decentralization Recentralization
Urbanization/
industrialization 
policy focus
Moderate •   Phase II  
(mid-1990s–2013)
Intense •   Phase I  
(1978–mid-1990s)
•   Phase III  
(2013–present)
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level of diligence and depth. Since this administration is but a few years old, and 
its plans are not yet fully formed let alone implemented, the final section of this 
chapter will speculate as to what is likely to happen in the future in the inter-
action between China’s policies and its administrative hierarchy.
 This analysis constructs four arguments about the relationship between the 
changes in China’s administrative hierarchy and the country’s developmental 
path. First, an “urban fever” permeated each of the levels of government during 
the first period and even during the second. This weakened the institutions that 
supported agriculture and rural communities, exacerbating inequality. Second, 
Hu’s checking of urban power and focus on rural areas helped to claw back 
some of the excesses of the earlier period. Yet, even as Hu advocated rural devel-
opment, including the establishment of a new social countryside and the 
strengthening of China’s social welfare regime in rural areas, most of the 
country continued to pursue urbanization. Nevertheless, the Hu administration 
did make a difference. While the administration deserves much of the criticism it 
has drawn, its accomplishments, while muted, still provided some relief for rural 
areas. Moreover, its failures stemmed not from neglecting to advance economic 
policies that attempted to redress China’s imbalances, but rather from its being 
too weak in driving those policies. Third, the Xi–Li administration’s urbaniza-
tion drive threatens to resurrect many of the problems seen during the Jiang 
Zemin administration, yet will provide little of the innovation and energy 
sparked by decentralization. The combination of deepening recentralization and 
even more aggressive urbanization implies that China might encounter the 
worst of both worlds. Finally, even as previous urbanization has fundamentally 
reshaped the relationships between levels of government in China, the ambi-
tious plans of the Xi–Li administration cannot be contained within the current 
structure of local administration. More fundamental changes in China’s admin-
istrative hierarchy can be expected.
 China manages its central ruling dilemma by dividing government into dif-
ferent levels, each with overlapping and complex responsibilities and powers. As 
noted in Chapter 1, the number and nature of these levels has not been static, 
but has varied over time. Table 5.3 shows the changes in the various levels and 
sub- levels during select years of the reform era. Since China’s administrative 
hierarchy has been summarized in Chapter 1, this chapter will not introduce the 
nature and functions of each level, except to note that administrative organiza-
tion in China is dizzyingly complex. Moreover, governing in the real world 
depends less on the formal separation of powers outlined in Chapter 1, and 
more on the give- and-take negotiation that decision- making and implementa-
tion inevitably entails (see Chapter 6). Instead this chapter focuses on wholesale 
changes in each level of government and in the relationship between them 
sparked by the urbanization and industrialization seen during the reform era. 
This has caused fundamental changes in the distribution of power, making the 
dynamics of the central–local relationship that much more complex. How has 
this balance of power been changed?
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Phase I: 1978–mid- 1990s
After the initial years of reform, which focused primarily on rectifying political 
excesses caused by the Cultural Revolution and the breaking up of rural com-
munes, the Chinese government got to work developing the broader economy. 
These measures commenced with the establishment of Special Economic Zones 
(SEZs) as early as July 1979, the opening of several cities along China’s eastern 
coastlines in the mid- 1980s, the attraction of foreign investment, and the estab-
lishment of manufacturing joint ventures (Naughton 1995; Zeng 2011). Sub-
sequent policies reinforced these bold initiatives, with economic growth and 
policy together promoting China’s rapid urbanization (Deng et al. 2008). The 
Deng and Jiang administrations were so successful at urbanization that, between 
1979 and 2002, China’s urban population increased from 19.4 percent to 39.1 
percent. China’s growth and urbanization exacerbated inequality, as urban areas 
outstripped rural ones. While the reform of rural land ownership through the 
household responsibility system and the promotion of town and village enter-
prises (TVEs) initially helped to reduce China’s inequality (Chen et al. 2013), 
the country’s Gini index soared from 0.257 to 0.447 between 1983 and 2002. 
Moreover, the process of urbanization was both facilitated by, and had an 
impact on, the roles and functions of China’s government at every level of the 
administrative hierarchy.
Provinces: the hub of decentralized governance
Provinces became powerful political units in their own right during the reform 
era. As can be seen from Table 5.3, the number of provinces increased modestly 
from 29 in 1978 to 33 by 1999. But more importantly, the roles and functions 
of provinces changed, as provincial leaders were given the power and flexibility 
to promote economic development and urbanization.
 The four provincial- level units created during this period each had a direct 
bearing on urbanization not only within their territories, but also in their sur-
rounding areas, and even across much of the rest of China. First, in 1988, the 
entirety of Hainan Island was carved out of Guangdong province, becoming the 
first new provincial- level unit to be established since 1967. The plans for this orig-
inated in discussions between China’s State Council and Guangdong province as 
early as 1980, and by 1983 the State Council had laid the groundwork for the 
development of Hainan province. These leaders had two goals in mind. The first 
was to rapidly increase the pace of development of the island itself. Although 
Hainan had plentiful natural resources, it was extremely poor, with as many as 
one- sixth of Hainan’s people living below China’s low poverty line (Feng and 
Goodman 1997). As Deng Xiaoping noted in an influential speech early in 1984: 
“We want to develop Hainan Island. If we were able to quicken the pace of Hain-
an’s development, that would be a great victory” (Deng 1984). Second, Hainan 
was to be the fourth of four planned SEZs, allowing China to experiment with 
reforms in limited areas. If the reforms created unintended consequences in 
112  J.A. Donaldson
Hainan or in any other SEZ, the failures would not affect all of the country. At 
the same time, Hainan- as-laboratory had implications for subsequent national 
reforms. In practice, Hainan’s overall economy developed rapidly, its province’s 
per capita GDP skyrocketing from RMB925 in 1987 to RMB38,924 in 2014 
(Statistical Bureau of the People’s Republic of China 2015). On this measure at 
least, it was indeed the “great victory” Deng had hoped it would be.
 Despite this success, Hainan also became synonymous with the excesses of 
reform. Corruption became rampant. As early 1984, Hainan was embroiled in a 
notorious automobile scandal in which provincial officials profited personally by 
abusing the province’s exemption from import restrictions and tariffs (Wank 
2009). Further, a Hainan mayor’s abject corruption and abusive behavior was 
ignored for a time due to his success in economic development, until his superi-
ors were subsequently compelled to oust and arrest him (Paik and Baum 2014). 
One recent study concluded that Haikou, Hainan’s capital, was the most 
corrupt out of 118 Chinese cities sampled, with a score nearly three standard 
deviations from the mean (Wang 2014). Apart from overt corruption, Hainan’s 
status as a SEZ sparked a rapid real estate boom that, while inflating Hainan’s 
GDP, quickly turned into a property bubble. Between 1988 and 1992, drawn 
in by an array of favorable policies from the central government, a large volume 
of capital was introduced in Hainan. Some 5,000 real estate companies had 
invested in Hainan by 1992. While real estate investment in Hainan was a 
modest RMB320 million in 1989, this soon ballooned to RMB9.3 billion by 
1993. After the bubble burst, around 4.5 million square meters of property and 
20,000 hectares of developed land were left idle (Wang and Wang 2009).
 If the establishment of Hainan as a province was intended to deepen urbani-
zation and spark the development of that region, the establishment of Chong-
qing as a provincial- level municipality in 1997 signaled a strengthening of these 
intentions. While little is known about the reaction of Guangdong’s provincial 
leaders to Hainan being granted provincial status,2 the establishment of Chong-
qing as China’s fourth provincial- level city provoked strong resistance in Sichuan 
province. Chongqing had long been Sichuan’s largest and most economically 
important city, dwarfing the province’s capital city Chengdu in terms of GDP, 
population, and the extent of industrialization.
 Chongqing was one of the centrally administered municipalities that the 
Republic of China had established in the late 1920s, a status that was canceled 
under the People’s Republic of China in the mid- 1950s.3 The idea of reestab-
lishing Chongqing as a provincial- level municipality independent of Sichuan 
reportedly originated as early as the 1980s, when Deng Xiaoping privately con-
sidered dividing his home province of Sichuan into two, with Chongqing 
forming the capital of one of the halves. As the plan became finalized during the 
mid- 1990s, China’s leaders decided that Chongqing would instead become 
China’s fourth provincial- level municipality, along with Beijing, Shanghai, and 
Tianjin. Two primary goals motivated Chongqing’s upgrade to provincial- level 
municipality. The first was that Chongqing would lead China’s construction of 
the Three Gorges Dam, which started operations in 2003. This massive dam, 
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with 98.8 billion kw hours of generated electricity in 2014, is the world’s largest 
by installed capacity (Agence France- Press 2015). Chongqing, as a provincial- 
level unit, would have the gravitas to spearhead a project of this scale, complex-
ity, and sensitivity. Second, as a provincial- level unit Chongqing would provide 
for its continued development and urbanization. The city became a growth pole 
not only for its urban core and the dozens of county- level units underneath it, 
but also for much of China’s southwestern region. Thus, the promotion of 
Chongqing to a provincial- level municipality was designed to help spread 
China’s continued urbanization and development to the country’s neglected 
southwestern region (Hong 2004).
 So too, the return of Hong Kong and, to a lesser extent, the tiny territory of 
Macau, helped to facilitate urbanization far beyond their borders. As Special 
Administrative Regions (SARs), these two provincial- level entities hold auto-
nomous powers over a wide range of economic and social areas, with Beijing’s 
sole formal responsibilities centered on defense and foreign policy (Yep 2009). 
These two SARs would support the two mainland cities across from them, Shen-
zhen and Zhuhai, respectively, which were among China’s original four SEZs. 
For instance, Hong Kong accounts for over 50 percent of Shenzhen’s foreign 
capital and imports nearly 40 percent of Shenzhen’s goods. Furthermore, offi-
cials from the two areas have issued joint visions of development for the region 
(Shen and Luo 2013). Hong Kong’s economic impact on mainland China has, 
moreover, extended well beyond Shenzhen. It has long been China’s main 
source of foreign direct investment (Davies 2013), and even if much of that 
investment is channeled from other countries (and even round- tripped from 
Chinese investors), this nevertheless shows the importance of Hong Kong to 
China’s overall development. Naturally, Guangdong province has been the main 
beneficiary of Hong Kong’s economic influence, followed by China’s three 
coastal provincial- level municipalities (Shanghai, Beijing, and Tianjin), and by 
four key Chinese coastal provinces (Fujian, Hainan, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang). 
Thus, Hong Kong’s economic impact extended well beyond its neighbors. The 
same is true, though to a far more limited extent, for Macau, with its economic 
link to the city of Zhuhai.
 Thus, each of the four new provincial- level governments created between 
1984 and 1999 helped to promote China’s goal of development and urbaniza-
tion. Yet, provinces did not just increase in number. The central government, as 
a major part of its reform strategy, empowered all provinces during this period, 
granting them new powers and responsibilities. First, the central government 
reduced its control over personnel decisions, decentralizing much of this power 
to the provinces (see Chapter 6). As early as 1984, the central government 
stopped the practice of appointing officials two levels below itself, allowing gov-
ernments to make major personnel appointments at the same level and to 
choose the top leadership of one level of government below them. Thus, while 
provincial leaders still serve at the behest of the central leadership, they now 
make around two- thirds of the appointments that the central leadership had 
previously made, sharply enhancing the ability of provincial and other local 
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leaders to select their own teams (see e.g., Shirk 1993). Second, while Mao’s 
administration, particularly during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), 
rewarded and punished party members, including local officials, on their demon-
strated commitment to ideological orthodoxy (i.e., their “red”-ness), Deng’s 
administration by contrast focused on local officials’ degree of competence (i.e., 
their “expert”-ness), especially their ability to generate economic growth. While 
the center held all provincial leaders accountable for promoting economic devel-
opment, maintaining political and social stability, and implementing central- 
level policies such as family planning, provincial governments were given 
substantial leeway in choosing the process to accomplish these goals. 
 Third, from the mid- 1980s the central government allowed provincial gov-
ernments to commit to large- scale investment projects without obtaining central 
approval (see Chapter 3). These included foreign investment projects involving 
up to US$30 million, a figure that was subsequently increased to US$100 
million. By 2001, the State Council removed many of the remaining barriers to 
provincial discretion over investment in nearly all sectors (Chung 2001). Fourth, 
as outlined in Chapter 2, provincial and other local entities were given substan-
tial control over budgets, and were allowed to retain a portion of the taxes they 
raised, further incentivizing economic development that expanded the tax base. 
This provided provinces with vast new resources with which to pursue develop-
ment and infrastructure projects. While the 1994 tax reform reshuffled taxes and 
helped to increase the tax base of the central government, local governments 
still held substantial capabilities to raise taxes and set their own budgets. Finally, 
the central government intentionally loosened the boundaries for strategies 
through which local governments could achieve economic growth targets and 
development goals, allowing a degree of policy flexibility that permitted local 
governments to experiment with policies. This sort of “experimentation under 
hierarchy” has subsequently become an important feature in setting administra-
tive control and planning. In this way, local governments generated and tested a 
range of policy options that, when successful, could then be rolled out to other 
areas (Heilmann 2008).
 The provinces have used this latitude to develop innovative development 
strategies. For example, the Pearl River Delta area of Guangdong province, 
which includes the city of Guangzhou, along with the dynamic SEZ Shenzhen 
and surrounding areas, implemented a development strategy based on attracting 
foreign investment in basic, low- tech manufacturing in the early days of reform. 
Under this model, millions of rural migrants were pulled out of poverty by the 
jobs generated by low- tech manufacturing. By contrast, the southern portion of 
the coastal province of Jiangsu developed through the promotion of TVEs. The 
Yangtze River Delta development model leveraged the advantages that local 
officials- turned-entrepreneurs had in rallying resources and labor. These TVEs 
remained competitive through much of the 1990s, though they soon lost much 
of their comparative advantage, after which the model’s usefulness declined. Yet 
for a time, this model contributed to driving the rapidly growing region of 
southern Jiangsu and elsewhere (see e.g., Oi 1995).
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Prefecture- level municipalities: rivaling the power of provinces and 
consuming counties
As dramatic as the shift in the role of provincial government has been, the 
changing role of the prefecture- level governments has, in some ways, been even 
more radical. At the start of the reform era, prefectures were primarily consti-
tuted as dispatch offices staffed by provincial officials sent to implement policy at 
a more local level. However, as can be seen in Figure 5.1, during the reform era 
the vast majority of these prefectures were converted into powerful prefecture- 
level municipalities (in a process called digaishi), with the number of prefectures 
dropping rapidly from 170 in 1982 to 113 in 1990 and just 37 in 2002. At the 
same time, the number of prefecture- level municipalities increased rapidly, 
increasing from less than one- third of all prefecture- level units in 1978 to just 
under 80 percent by 2001, with the actual number rising from 112 in 1982 to 
265 in 2001. In addition, a small number of county- level units were promoted 
to prefecture- level municipalities, with the total number of prefecture- level units 
increasing from 316 in 1981 to 333 in 2003, where it remains today. The addi-
tion of fully staffed and increasingly powerful prefecture- level and deputy- 
provincial-level municipalities effectively transformed what had been primarily a 
dispatch office into a powerful and formidable additional level of government. 
Moreover, all counties that were under the prefecture were administratively 
placed under the newly established prefecture- level municipality. In this way, 
the prefecture- level municipality effectively became a new unit that could rival 
the power and influence of provinces.
 The growing economic and political might of China’s prefecture- level muni-
cipalities is a recent phenomenon that was both a cause and an effect of China’s 
rapid urbanization. Ever since the opening up of China post- 1978, Chinese 
prefecture- level municipalities have become the core of the country’s economic 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
19
78
 
19
79
 
19
80
 
19
81
 
19
82
 
19
83
 
19
84
 
19
85
 
19
86
 
19
87
 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
20
11
 
20
12
 
Prefecture-level governments (total number) 
Number of prefecture-level cities 
Figure 5.1 The transformation of the prefecture, 1978–2012.
116  J.A. Donaldson
growth, with then leader Deng Xiaoping envisioning cities as growth poles 
fueling China’s development (Chien 1992; Wu 1992). Prefecture- level muni-
cipalities, with their control over vast territories that included both urban and 
rural areas, were responsible for their own share of innovation in development 
policy. For example, the coastal prefecture- level municipality of Wenzhou imple-
mented a set of policies focusing on small- scale family- owned firms. While 
private actors were key to this “Wenzhou model,” local officials supported the 
development of such firms by protecting private property rights and creating the 
conditions for entrepreneurship. The restructuring of private enterprise into 
shareholding collectives primed central government receptiveness and assuaged 
local entrepreneurs’ concerns over the protection of property rights. Moreover, 
the collectivization of enterprises also saw tax benefits and increased access to 
factor, product, land and credit markets, greatly facilitating their growth. Thus, 
Wenzhou – a prefecture- level municipality – became a key driver of economic 
growth, but in a form that differs markedly from that of the varied approaches 
of other similar cities (see e.g., Liu 1992; Parris 1993; Whiting 1999). Overall, 
China’s “city- first” policy of economic development transferred resources from 
the counties to the cities. While county- level units continued to be the primary 
implementers of policy, most of the power to set policy direction and strategy 
lay in the hands of the prefecture, the county’s superior – and in most cases this 
meant the prefecture- level municipality.
The urbanization of formerly rural counties
The mainstay of China’s rural economy, the county, urbanized rapidly during 
the 1978 to mid- 1990s period. Administratively, this shift has occurred in two 
primary ways. First, some counties have been administratively shifted into 
county- level municipalities, a process called xiangaishi. In contrast to the Maoist 
period, when this transformation most commonly occurred by carving out 
the urbanized section of the county to form a new county- level unit, the 
county- level municipalities that came into being after 1982 were established by 
transforming the entire county – rural and urban areas alike – into a county- level 
city. This transformation occurred rapidly (see Figure 5.2). Of the 2,153 
county- level units in China in 1978, more than three- quarters (1,653) were 
rural counties – not urban districts or county- level municipalities. By 1997, that 
proportion had dropped to less than one- third (524 of 1,693). Whereas only 92 
county- level municipalities existed in 1978, that number doubled by 1986, and 
continued rising rapidly until 1997, when there were 442 county- level municip-
alities. Of the hundreds of counties that had become country- level cities that 
year, all but 15 came about by transforming the entire county into a county- 
level city. This helped to prevent the kind of opposition seen during previous 
periods, and also reduced the need to significantly add staff.
 Overall, this initiative was problematic. The standards for switching to a 
county- level city were too low, and the central government approved too many 
applications as counties pursued this status in a “blind fever” (Chung and Lam 
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2004). In some ways, these changes were largely cosmetic. Although many 
counties were eager to become cities, this did not formally shift the balance of 
power. There was no hierarchical change between a county- level municipality 
and the prefecture- level government above it; the county remained one level 
below the prefecture as before (Lam 2009). Yet in terms of the ability to urban-
ize, the switch to a city was in some ways more than symbolic. County designa-
tion implied a lack of political clout with upper level officials, as well as the 
perception that the local government was powerless to develop, even if it tried. 
By becoming a city, a county was better able to justify urban construction 
within the urbanized areas of the county, acquiring rural farmland for urban 
construction and attracting additional external investment, compared with when 
it was “just” a county (Xingzhen Quhua Wang 2015). In one particularly suc-
cessful example, the county- level city of Kunshan has outperformed the eco-
nomic development of larger and administratively higher governments, a 
phenomenon referred to as “a big foot wearing a small shoe” (dajiao chuan 
xiaoxie). The Kunshan government’s use of official and informal ties was signifi-
cantly strengthened when it managed through these relationships to upgrade to 
a county- level city. Although Kunshan’s hierarchical position has not formally 
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changed, its leaders have gained access to additional resources and clout. These 
have proved to be essential for supporting Kunshan’s impressive growth and 
development (Chien 2013).
 In the second and more important of the two major transformations, China’s 
rapidly growing legion of prefecture- level municipalities absorbed many coun-
ties below them by transferring their underlings’ status from county to county- 
level urban district. The number of urban districts has increased greatly – from 
408 in 1978 to 727 in 1997 – under the process known as “turning counties 
into urban districts” (chexian gaiqu). The most rapid changes occurred between 
1983 and 1985, as newly created prefecture- level municipalities immediately 
expanded their territories by transferring counties beneath them into urban dis-
tricts. Yet because most of these newly created urban districts were not in any 
sense “urban,” the prefecture- level municipalities above them continued to 
manage them as agriculture- dominated entities. Thus, the increase in the 
number of urban districts seen in the first phase had less of a negative effect on 
the county. The second, post- 1985, phase was more traumatic, as most major 
cities transferred many of the remaining counties under their administrations 
into urban districts with the intention of urbanizing them (Ye 2012; Liu 2013).
 These conversions were facilitated by the 1993 State Council approval of a 
Ministry of Civil Affairs report that established standards for the conversion of 
counties into urban districts (State Council of the People’s Republic of China 
1993). From a city’s point of view, establishing new urban districts significantly 
expands its scope for development. Because the prefecture- level municipality 
exerts great power over the districts, it can better coordinate development 
throughout its entire territory. While this promotes the municipality’s interests, 
many scholars have criticized its negative impact on the county. First, with the 
loss both of county status and of any substantial power to control itself as an 
urban district, some counties that have become urban districts under larger 
cities have lost their historical identity.4 Second, the situation in the county 
often worsens after conversion to an urban district, as its resources are diverted 
to the development of the city core while its own needs are often largely neg-
lected (Lam 2009).
 In any case, chexian gaiqu created major changes in the balance of power. 
On the one hand, since the 1980s the district level has emerged as a separate 
level of fiscal management. A wide range of responsibilities has devolved to 
these urban districts, such as road construction and utility management. During 
the mid- 1990s, a new division of labor emerged under which prefecture- level 
municipalities would be responsible for planning and managing city- wide pro-
jects, while urban districts took responsibility for projects within their districts. 
On the other hand, the prefecture is far more powerful, and the urban districts 
do not have the autonomy or powers that they possessed as counties in terms of 
planning, approving construction projects, or managing land supply and foreign 
exchange, nor do they enjoy the flexibility held by counties to approve foreign- 
invested projects or direct development policy (Chung and Lam 2004). Thus, 
while some responsibilities have been devolved to urban districts, these have not 
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been matched with devolutions in fiscal or substantial power. The typical urban 
district mainly implements projects that are outlined by the officials above them. 
Worse, these projects are often underfunded; urban districts must bear the addi-
tional burden of funding projects that are sometimes not of their choosing and 
that may not even be in their interests (Chung and Lam 2004; Lam and Lo 
2009).
 Typically, opposition to the conversion of counties to urban districts is 
limited to grumbling and ivory tower handwringing. However, in some cases, 
the opposition is so strong that people march in the street in significant protest. 
For instance, when Changxing county was converted into a district under Zhe-
jiang province’s Huzhou municipality, thousands of local residents braved the 
rain to present a petition calling for the move to be reversed. That morning, a 
letter with 27 signatures, including those of ten village chiefs threatening to 
resign, also appeared online and soon went viral. Petitioners and protesters 
shared the concern that under the authority of Huzhou, Changxing county’s 
booming economy would stagnate. The protestors cited the example of the 
urban district of Nanxun that had once been among China’s most prosperous 
and powerful counties. Nanxun’s financial strength had slowly declined after its 
transfer to an urban district under Huzhou prefecture. That very afternoon, 
Changxing county’s party secretary temporarily halted the proposed move, as 
Huzhou prefecture officials moved to reach a compromise with Changxing 
(Guangchazhe Wang 2013). In spite of this, even today, Changxing county 
appears on the list of applications for conversion to an urban district (He 2014).
The formation, hollowing out, and urbanization of townships
Just as China’s county- level units changed radically during the 1978 to mid- 
1990s period, so too did the lowest formal level of China’s administration – the 
townships. The transformation of townships post- 1980 encompasses not only 
numerical shifts (see Figure 5.3), but also changes in their administrative struc-
ture. The breakup of communes following the post- Mao period led to a rapid 
increase in the number of townships. By 1983, the year after communes were 
abolished, there were just under 50,000 township- level governments in China. 
This ballooned rapidly, doubling to more than 106,000 by 1984. The numbers 
increased so quickly that, by 1985, the central government felt compelled to 
halt the approval of townships. Subsequently, townships that were too small in 
scale to be effective were merged to form larger townships. Through this 
process, the number was pared down considerably to just over 81,000 in 1987. 
From there, the numbers continued to dwindle as townships merged, dipping 
below 51,000 by 1997, a decline of 20 percent in ten years.
 Not only did the number of townships decline during this period, so too did 
their substantial powers. First, this was the period of great “hollowing out” of 
township governments, as they came increasingly under direct control of the 
counties above them. As discussed in Chapter 1, this has led some analysts to 
refer to township administration during the reform period as “skeletons” 
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(kongjia zi) – that is, no longer capable of performing its responsibilities prop-
erly – and also as a level of government with “little power, big responsibilities, 
and weak capacity” (quanxiao, zeda, nengruo) (Xu 2002, 2003; Bao 2007). 
Second, several rural, agricultural- based townships (xiang) shifted to become 
urban- oriented towns (zhen). This was due to the growing urbanization of 
China and the reforms in agricultural taxes and the overall township institu-
tional structure. Whereas towns had represented just under six percent of all 
township- level entities in 1978, that proportion increased to 35 percent by 
1996. Although townships and towns are formally on the same administrative 
levels, the designation of “town” provides more gravitas, signaling an effort to 
develop and urbanize. Third, many township- level governments merged directly 
into cities, becoming township- level urban subdistricts. In the early period, 
urban districts also consolidated, though much more slowly – their numbers 
declined by four percent from 5,304 in 1983 to a reform- era low of 5,099 in 
1988. The number of townships then increased by more than 10 percent to 
5,678 in 1997. Because townships lose their administrative independence almost 
entirely upon becoming an urban subdistrict, the conversion of towns and 
townships to urban subdistricts is in many ways even more traumatic than the 
conversion of counties to urban districts.
Assessing the balance of power in Phase I
The first phase brought many changes in China’s administrative hierarchy 
designed to support the urbanization and industrialization of the country. 
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Assessed on these measures, China’s initiatives were a great success. Not only 
did the urbanization rate double between 1980 and 2002 (as mentioned 
earlier), but also the rate of economic growth increased rapidly through indus-
trialization and promotion of the service industry. Agriculture’s share of GDP 
declined from 30.2 percent to 13.7 percent during that time. While the agricul-
tural sector contributed as much as 9.6 percent of China’s growth in GDP in 
1996, this contribution had declined to 3.4 percent by 2003 (State Statistical 
Bureau of the People’s Republic of China various years). The changes in the 
administrative hierarchy were not only necessary to support China’s develop-
ment policies; the successful industrialization and urbanization further strength-
ened urbanized levels of government, such as prefecture- level municipalities. 
Yet, China’s development came at an acute cost, as the country’s rapid develop-
ment not only created winners and losers, but the price of these administrative 
changes was both high and borne primarily by those – in rural and poor areas 
particularly – least able to bear it. No level gained more power than the 
prefecture- level municipalities, with their absorption of counties and townships 
to create new urban districts and subdistricts – moves which greatly expanded 
their space to urbanize. Decentralization benefitted provinces considerably as 
well, though they were compelled to share power with prefectures. Newly 
created county- level municipalities gained at least additional gravitas, which 
many were able to leverage into real gains. Rural counties and townships lost 
much of their power.
 China’s development came with additional costs. First, while the provincial 
governments’ new leeway with regard to direct investment sparked rapid eco-
nomic development, it also created at least two major problems. New budgetary 
responsibilities compelled provincial leaders to industrialize too rapidly in order 
to raise revenues and promote economic growth. These powerful incentives 
spurred investment in projects that maximized short- term returns, but were not 
necessarily efficient. As provincial governments invested more funds into produc-
tive factors, local economies began to overheat, sparking rounds of rapid inflation 
across China. The reduplication of industries also became rife throughout the 
country. These new sources of largess also proved tempting, and official corrup-
tion worsened throughout the bureaucracy. Furthermore, even as they promoted 
their sometimes uncompetitive local industries, provincial officials moved to 
protect these infant businesses from outside competition by excluding competing 
products from other provinces, hoarding raw materials over which they had 
control, and erecting bureaucratic barriers against regional trade (Wedeman 
2003). These barriers further exacerbated economic inefficiency and, as redupli-
cated inefficient industries spread across the county, a thorny national problem 
emerged. Thus, while these changes helped promote reform and growth, they 
also triggered new problems that affected the quality of growth and created chal-
lenges that required central intervention (Shirk 1993; Lee 1998).
 Second, decentralization often undermined the accountability of lower 
levels of government to the center. The top- down pressure that was applied 
to keep local governments in line in turn undermined horizontal and local 
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accountability – both important mechanisms for checking abuse. In terms of 
implementation, the ability of local governments to circumvent central dictates 
remains limited, yet local implementation can nonetheless be slow or negligible 
under certain conditions (see Chapter 6). In addition to foot- dragging, the rel-
ative lack of accountability leaves some local areas prone to abuse. Accounts of 
predatory local governments are not rare. As a result, local protests have signifi-
cantly increased – one estimate suggests that these protests have risen from 
9,000 in 1994 to some 180,000 in 2010 (Chan et al. 2014). Ironically, local 
grievances that have undermined confidence in the local government have actu-
ally bolstered support for the central government, which has emerged as a locus 
for airing these grievances (O’Brien and Li 2006).
 Third, local governments were incentivized to overinvest in both real estate 
and infrastructure, fueled by easy access to credit from state- owned banks and 
by the ability to transfer rural land into urban. While local governments are pro-
hibited from borrowing directly from banks, the widespread but now restricted 
practice of using off- balance-sheet entities allowed them to access billions of 
yuan in loans. Most cities throughout China underwent massive transforma-
tions, including the building of commercial and residential infrastructure (Back 
2015). Much of this investment was wasteful, with considerably more supply of 
real estate than there was demand to fill it. At its worst, local investment created 
entire “ghost cities” – entire towns or areas of cities where occupation rates are 
tiny (Sorace and Hurst 2016). Local governments also invested massively in 
infrastructure, including highways, bridges, and public transportation. This has 
led to widespread speculation that housing and infrastructure bubbles are 
growing in China, contributing to the estimated US$400 billion in bad debt 
held by the country’s top four banks. Local government debt, according to one 
source, has reached some RMB20–25 trillion (US$4–4.8 trillion), compared to 
China’s overall foreign exchange reserve of US$3.56 trillion held at the end of 
August 2015 (Back 2015).
 Fourth, decentralization greatly favored coastal areas. As described above, 
some of the earliest reforms under Deng Xiaoping empowered coastal cities and 
provinces with a special status, opening them up to international markets and 
helping them attract massive amounts of foreign investment. These policies 
exacerbated these areas’ geographic advantages to create a wide gap among 
China’s regions. From 1978 to at least 2000, interregional inequality increased 
sharply and steadily. Starting in 1978, China’s growth core shifted from the 
country’s old industrial regions of Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, Liaoning, and Hei-
longjiang to a new growth core, primarily the coastal provinces of Shandong, 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong. By 1990, this core was continuing to 
grow quickly, and was joined by the previously rapidly growing provinces of 
Shanghai, Beijing, and Tianjin (see e.g., Fan 2008; Li and Gibson 2013).
 The same policies that generated unprecedented economic growth also 
widened the already substantial gap between coastal and inland provinces, as well 
as between urban and rural areas. Many argue that central authority is needed to 
redress China’s growing regional inequalities spurred by decentralization.
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Phase II (mid- 1990s–2012): recentralization and curbing the focus on 
urbanization under the Hu Jintao administration
The problems described above as well as others were linked directly or indirectly 
to excessive decentralization. As the central government faced these issues, its 
leaders changed China’s direction in many ways. First, the central government 
clawed back power in order to drive a range of policy initiatives that would not 
be supported by powerful local governments. These included measures such as 
regional development initiatives designed to reduce inequality (as described in 
Chapter 4); new rural and urban welfare policies (see Chapter 8); new restric-
tions on finance and investment (discussed in Chapters 2 and 3); and additional 
mechanisms to monitor faithful implementation of central policy (as described 
in Chapter 6). Second, the Hu administration sought to cool down China’s 
widespread “city fever.” The efforts to create a new socialist countryside, 
detailed in Chapter 8, are a case in point. The successful implementation of 
these and other initiatives required the recentralization of power, as discussed in 
other chapters. Also relevant for this chapter, the central government moderated 
its long- standing and firm commitment to “growth at any cost,” and particu-
larly its commitment to urbanization and industrialization.
 How did these efforts to recentralize and moderate the pursuit of urbaniza-
tion affect the administrative hierarchy? As noted in Table 5.2, Phase II is char-
acterized by both recentralization and a moderate shift away from urbanization. 
Both of these can be traced back to the late Jiang Zemin era. But it was the Hu 
Jintao administration that brought new energy to both of these features. Two 
particular initiatives that involve China’s administrative hierarchy have been 
noteworthy in this regard.
Curbing the power of the prefecture vis- à-vis the county
First, starting in 1997, the much abused initiative to shift counties to county- 
level municipalities (xiangaishi) almost ceased. The central government, whose 
permission was required constitutionally for these shifts (see Chapter 1), sus-
pended all applications. After increasing to a high of 445 county- level municip-
alities in 1996, the number then not only stabilized but even declined slightly. 
By 2012, there were only 368 county- level municipalities. Meanwhile, the cam-
paign to increase the number of county- level urban districts continued even 
longer, into the mid- 2000s; these increased a further 17 percent (from 727 to 
852) between 1997 and 2004. Since more than half of these new urban districts 
were former county- level municipalities, urbanization came somewhat less at the 
expense of rural areas, and instead were more contained within previously 
urbanized areas. Eventually, the creation of urban districts was virtually halted, 
as only eight were established between 2004 and 2012.
 In addition, new initiatives were designed to strengthen the county – particu-
larly rural counties, but also county- level municipalities – in relation to 
prefecture- level units. Based on China’s administrative hierarchy, the county is 
124  J.A. Donaldson
located at a level below the prefecture and is subject to its control. As prefec-
tures were rapidly transferred to become prefecture- level municipalities, increas-
ing in power and independence, new tensions arose. As noted previously, 
conflicts broke out in the process of transforming counties to urban districts. 
Even more than this, however, those counties that had not been turned into 
urban districts came under the increasing control and scrutiny of the prefecture- 
level municipalities above them. 
 From the point of view of the county, problems with the “city leading 
county” system were manifold. First, as the prefecture became an administrative 
level in its own right, and no longer served as a provincially- controlled dispatch 
office, it in effect increased by one the number of effective levels between the 
center and counties. In many cases, this increased the distance between the 
county and the center, rendering communication more difficult and administra-
tion less efficient (Li and Chen 2012). Second, prefecture- level municipalities 
by and large focused on urban development and solving urban problems, and 
municipal leaders were increasingly far less focused on issues facing the rural 
counties beneath them, especially when compared to the early reform years. 
Counties’ needs simply did not receive attention from their superiors, who were 
focused on urban problems and urban needs (Bo 2006). Third, in the “city 
leading county” system, a mismatch between authority and accountability 
occurred in cases where the county perceived itself as being wealthier or more 
important than the city – this was the case for Guangdong province’s wealthy 
Shunde county in the relatively modestly developed Foshan municipality. In 
such cases, it could become difficult for prefecture- level municipalities to exert 
authority over counties (Li and Chen 2012). Fourth and most importantly, city 
officials were often criticized for interfering with the counties below them. 
Prefecture- level municipalities have been shown to divert funds that the center 
had allocated for supporting counties, using them instead for their own pur-
poses. They have also been accused of exploiting the county’s resources to 
promote the interests of their urban core. Critics have described this situation as 
shi ka xian (the city blocking the county) or shi gua xian (the city exploiting the 
county) (Lam 2009). Overall, despite the various ways in which prefecture- level 
municipalities have managed the counties beneath them, the “city leading 
county” system has typically privileged the city’s interests over that of the 
county and exacerbated some of the problems that have emerged from 
urbanization.
Placing the county under the province
As a result of the outcomes of the “city leading county” system, the central gov-
ernment’s 2010 “No. 1 document” urged provinces to adopt a system of “prov-
ince leading the county” (sheng zhi guan xian) in which rural counties report 
directly to the province. This plan is based on the experience of the coastal prov-
ince of Zhejiang which had not followed the “one level down” rule for person-
nel appointments, but had instead permitted the provincial government to 
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appoint the top two county leaders in all but one prefecture. Zhejiang province 
also allowed its counties to deal directly with the provincial level in financial 
matters (Wu 2004). Taking Zhejiang’s experience as its model, the 2010 policy 
placed the county directly under the province, bypassing the formerly higher 
prefecture- level municipalities. Under this policy, the county would henceforth 
report directly to the province on issues such as personnel management, finan-
cial planning, and project approvals. Further, the plan decentralized some addi-
tional powers to the county, with the province directly authorizing the county’s 
new flexibility over finance, revenue, debt management, and other areas.
 In practice, provinces have adopted either or both of two forms of shengzhi-
guanxian. Under the financial form (form one) of this reform, the province 
bypasses the prefecture to directly transfer finances to the county, and monitors 
its use. The management form (form two) devolves socio- economic powers to 
the county (Zhu et al. 2015). As of 2012 (the latest statistics available), 28 of 
the 31 non- SAR/Taiwan provincial- level governments had implemented at least 
one form of shengzhiguanxian, and 20 of these had implemented both (see 
Table 5.4). The only provincial- level units that had not participated in either of 
the two forms were Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Xinjiang (autonomous 
provincial- level units with large minority populations), and Hainan province, 
the prefectures of which do not contain any counties.
 This reform – though only partially successful – is credited with improving 
China’s administrative system. First, it improved the county’s financial power 
and brought new resources directly to the county. It encouraged county leaders 
to innovate their development programs, and brought new powers and capa-
cities with which to do so (Li and Chen 2012; CPC News 2015). Moreover, 
because the provincial capital tends to be further away from the counties, it 
brought new autonomy to counties, which were nevertheless encouraged to use 
their flexibility to develop their own development strategies (Guo and Wu 
2012). Although some have criticized this empowerment of counties on the 
grounds that county governments sometimes pursue development wastefully (Li 
and Ye 2010), others have suggested that cities that control counties can also 
wastefully promote urbanization and development (Zhang 1999). Scholars have 
documented examples of counties that used their new autonomy effectively to 
develop their economies (e.g., Herberer and Schubert 2012). Overall, this 
policy has served to check the growing power of prefecture- level municipalities. 
It has allowed county- level governments more flexibility to develop rural areas. 
Combined with other initiatives that are less relevant to the administrative hier-
archy, such as the development of a new socialist countryside and the imple-
mentation of a stronger rural welfare system (described in Chapter 8), this 
policy has enhanced the position of county- level governments vis- à-vis 
prefecture- level municipalities (Lam 2009).
126  J.A. Donaldson
Assessing the balance of power in Phase II
As described above, the Hu Jintao administration deepened some changes that 
commenced in the Jiang Zemin era and added some new initiatives of its own. 
All of these were endeavoring to recentralize power and curb urbanization – in 
large part by altering China’s administrative hierarchy. They attempted to estab-
lish a new socialist countryside, and extended welfare protections to rural areas 
– an effort that required more power over prefecture- level governments. The 
central government constrained a number of powers over finance, investment, 
and implementation that had been enjoyed by many levels of government, 
 especially the prefecture level. Central government officials sharply reduced the 
practice of turning counties into urban districts and especially into county- level 
municipalities. They strengthened the province’s role with regard to rural 
Table 5.4  Province-leading-county reform – years of adoption by each provincial-level 
government (as of 2012)
Region Form one (financial) Form two (management)
Anhui 2006 2004
Beijing 1998 1998
Chongqing 1998 1998
Fujian – 2003
Gansu 2007 2005
Guangdong 2010 2005
Guangxi 2010 2004
Guizhou 2009 –
Hebei 2009 2005
Heilongjiang 2007 2004
Henan 2004 2004
Hubei 2004 2003
Hunan 2010 2005
Inner Mongolia – –
Jiangsu 2007 2012
Jiangxi 2005 –
Jilin 2005 2005
Liaoning 2010 2006
Ningxia – 2009
Qinghai 2007 –
Shaanxi 2007 2007
Shandong 2009 2003
Shanghai 1998 1998
Shanxi 1987 –
Sichuan – 2007
Tianjin 1998 1998
Tibet – –
Xinjiang – –
Yunnan 2010 2009
Zhejiang National model 1992
Source: Zhu et al. 2015, p. 62.
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counties, thereby also enhancing the discretion of county governments vis- à-vis 
prefecture- level municipalities. To some extent, these changes reflected a well- 
grounded need to rebalance some of China’s growing inequalities. They may 
also reflect Hu Jintao’s experience of living and working in poor provinces – he 
cut his teeth in Gansu province, which he knew well enough to be known as a 
walking map of the province, and in Guizhou, where he implemented pro- poor 
policies at the expense of GDP growth (Donaldson 2011). In many ways, these 
policies do seem to have reduced the pace of rising inequality. The east–west 
divide, according to one study, started to narrow in the mid- 2000s (Andersson 
et al. 2013). In spite of these pro- rural moves, however, China’s urbanization 
continued to increase rapidly – many of the Hu administration’s initiatives were 
not as successful as anticipated. In many ways, the ideologically conservative Hu 
Jintao, the recentralizer of power, was not too strong, as his critics contend, but 
was instead too weak. The Hu–Wen administration was unable to garner 
enough power to push its own priorities, let alone significantly salve the “urban 
fever” that gripped much of the country.
Phase III (2012–present): recentralization and deepening 
urbanization under the Xi–Li administration
In the context described above, China’s new president and general secretary, Xi 
Jinping (2012–present), and his premier, Li Keqiang, have found it relatively 
straightforward to resume China’s previous focus on urbanization and industri-
alization. Yet, this leadership duo have done so not by decentralizing power as 
Deng and Jiang had done, but by further recentralizing their grip over local 
governments and, in truth, much of the rest of society. In this way, Xi Jinping 
has been surprisingly assertive and successful in recentralizing power and 
 reasserting central control. On taking power, the Xi administration moved 
quickly to consolidate it, marginalizing or arresting the factional allies of Jiang 
Zemin and Hu Jintao, and putting loyalists in place. Moreover, Xi pledged to 
root out China’s endemic official corruption that has plagued all levels of 
 government. This anti- corruption campaign has so far proved to be surprisingly 
vigorous and, in contrast to previous campaigns under Jiang and Hu, has lasted 
for a surprisingly long period of time. Under this initiative, some 414,000 
 officials have reportedly been disciplined in some fashion.5
 The ultimate success of this campaign in creating the systemic changes 
needed to reduce high levels of corruption has been debated, and adjudicating 
this debate is beyond the scope of this chapter. In terms of its impact on admin-
istrative planning and organization, the campaign has supported other efforts to 
recentralize power. Widespread reports suggest that local officials throughout 
China have hunkered down, fearful lest the monitoring eyes of Beijing come 
scrutinizing past abuses of power. As a result, central policies are more faithfully 
implemented. While this has helped to mute some of the unintended con-
sequences of decentralization – real estate prices have eased as the zeal for rapid 
and often senseless urban construction has ebbed – it has also muted innovation 
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and other advantages of decentralization. Local officials have again become less 
innovative and more conservative, lest they draw unwanted attention from 
Beijing. This further dampened energy that had been sparked by decentraliza-
tion during the first phase of the reform period. Combined with other efforts to 
monitor implementation (Chapter 6), rein in local control over financial institu-
tions (Chapter 2), and other moves toward recentralizing power detailed 
throughout this book, the anti- corruption campaign has supported the Xi 
administration’s moves to deepen Hu Jintao’s efforts at recentralization. And in 
this regard, where Hu proved too weak, Xi has been surprisingly strong.
 Recentralized power is also helping the Xi administration usher in a new era 
of urbanization, but in an even more aggressive form designed to modernize 
China and spur consumption. Xi’s plan is based on recasting China’s household 
registration (or hukou) system, reimaging the distribution of rural land, and 
establishing enormous new urban clusters. In March 2014, China unveiled the 
National New- Type Urbanization Plan (2014–2020), marking a significant 
departure from China’s “institutionalized two- tier, rural–urban dual structure” 
under the hukou system. Underlying China’s ambitious plan is an economic 
imperative to raise the country’s declining growth rates by creating new city 
dwellers to drive demand over the next few decades. While details have yet to be 
publically released, official sources suggest that the plan aims to increase China’s 
urban population from 53.7 percent today to 60 percent by 2020.
 Since personal consumption is higher in cities than in the countryside, the 
plan focuses on increasing domestic demand by encouraging urbanization. It 
aims to absorb long- term urban- residing migrant workers and to further integ-
rate rural and urban areas in several ways (Johnson 2013; Kennedy 2014; 
Roberts 2014). Part of this urban shift will come from reforms that would allow 
migrants to register for permanent residence in the area where they are located. 
At the same time, the Xi–Li government is planning to adopt a tiered approach 
to hukou conversion from a rural hukou to an urban hukou, ranging from full 
liberalization in towns and small cites to strict control in China’s largest cities 
(see e.g., Chan 2014; Zhao 2014). Finally, through the establishment of new 
mega- city clusters in the central and western region, the urbanization plan aims 
to speed up the process and achieve an urbanized China much faster than would 
occur organically (Johnson 2013).
 While the full impact of this plan will not be known for years, it can be 
expected to fundamentally reshape the lives of most Chinese people. This in 
turn will entail major changes in China’s administrative hierarchy and the opera-
tion of the various levels of government. First, as detailed in Chapter 4, the 
Xi–Li administration’s plan to create five natural clusters will establish entities 
that cross several provinces. The Yangtze River Delta in coastal China crosses 
Shanghai and Jiangsu; the Pearl River Delta includes most of Guangdong as 
well as parts of Guangxi and Fujian; the Beijing–Tianjin–Hebei Delta combines 
a region known as Jing–Jin–Ji; the middle reaches of the Yangtze River links 
Hubei with Hunan and Jiangxi; and the Chengdu–Chongqing area reunites the 
two parts of Sichuan (Wang et al. 2015). Development and policy in these areas 
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will be carefully coordinated so that these regions can further integrate. Accord-
ing to Xu Xianping, Vice Minister of the National Development and Reform 
Commission, the plan has three goals. It will: 
1 convert rural populations into urban residents in a planned manner;
2 focus the integrated development of industrialization, the application of 
information technology, urbanization, and agricultural modernization;
3 closely coordinate the development of cities and small towns within these 
clusters.
To cater for the expected growth in population, the plan includes several targets 
for aggressively expanding its urban infrastructure (China.org.cn 2014).
 The integration of a region and the coordination of its development will 
require unprecedented cross- provincial cooperation. For instance, the Jing–Jin–
Ji region would integrate economies, assimilate migrants, provide services, and 
ramp up the construction of transportation linkages across the three provincial- 
level units of Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei. Despite decades of economic growth 
and industrialization, this massive region still harbors serious inequality and 
much diversity in social and economic conditions (Johnson 2013). Part of the 
purpose of regional economic integration is to spread growth outside of large 
cities and reduce these inequalities. Yet, at this point, the plan does not specify 
how these coordination challenges will be formally handled. Coordination 
between different governments – whether on the same administrative level or 
across levels – has invariably proven difficult. In the case of Jing–Jin–Ji, with 
these three regions’ remarkably different economic structures and distinct local 
interests, these difficulties can be expected to be even more considerable.
 Whether coordination occurs through some institution, or through the cre-
ation of a more formal super- provincial political structure, the successful promo-
tion of these five cross- provincial entities will almost certainly require the current 
system – with the province at the top of the hierarchy of local government – to 
be altered. How this will work is unclear. As detailed in Chapter 4, China’s 
central government has adopted a number of ad hoc committees and other forms 
of administration to ensure the successful implementation of these regional enti-
ties. However, as China’s history suggests, new administrative arrangements that 
are intended to be temporary representatives of the center can evolve into 
powerful levels in their own right. This is seen in the development of the prov-
ince in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Under the Yuan dynasty, the 
province began as a temporary outpost for the central government to monitor 
the activities of local governments, but over time it morphed into a permanent 
fixture of China’s administration (Fitzgerald 2002; Zhou 2005). While it is far 
too soon to determine whether these measures, intended to smoothen the estab-
lishment of the coordinated zones, will require a fundamental rethink of China’s 
administrative hierarchy, this outcome is not unprecedented.
 Despite its stated goals of helping China’s farmers, the plan has been criti-
cized on several grounds. First, although it aims to develop China’s smaller 
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cities, some argue that new jobs are more likely to arise in larger cities where 
economies of scale mean lower business costs. As a result, migrants are more 
likely to follow current migration routes to large cities in order to find employ-
ment. Without policies to attract industries and economic activity to small cities, 
China may be repeating previous failed urbanization attempts which led to 
“ghost cities” (Sorace and Hurst 2016). Second, while the plan reaffirms the 
importance of preserving the rights of farmers, it lacks a clear direction when it 
comes to reforming the rural land- transfer system. Critics have raised concerns 
that the plan to deepen urbanization will come at the expense of China’s land 
rights and will increase landlessness rates (Wang et al. 2015).
 Indeed, in some areas, fieldwork has already seen involuntary resettlement of 
villagers, whose houses are sometimes razed to increase urban land. Even when 
given a choice, individual farmers find it difficult to resist pressures to relocate 
to nearby towns – as their neighbors move, the villages to which they are accus-
tomed become intractably altered. When they move to nearby townships and 
towns, these former villagers must settle into multi- storied apartment buildings, 
which are difficult for the elderly to navigate. Without land, these former 
farmers must find new sources of income. In urban areas, they can grow no 
vegetables, raise no livestock, and produce no grain. At the same time, they face 
new expenses for utilities, food, and other necessities. They point out that life in 
the countryside was freer than in crowded urban spaces. Even when the apart-
ments are materially superior to their former homes, many former rural residents 
are unhappy with their new situation.
 A second cause for concern emerges from recent moves that center around 
restarting and expanding the conversion of counties to county- level cities and 
urban districts. As discussed above, xiangaishi conversions occurred rapidly, 
before being halted in 1997, while the conversion to urban districts slowed to a 
trickle after 2004. Under a central decision issued in February 2014, the central 
government appears poised to resume and deepen the conversion of counties to 
county- level municipalities and urban districts. According to local interviews, 
some county officials expect imminent changes in status, either to urban districts 
or to municipalities. Overall, central government has received around 170 
applications for counties to become urban districts and approximately 326 
applications for counties to become county- level municipalities. Since all but 25 
of these applications involve rural counties, this implies that more than one- 
quarter of the remaining county- level governments have applied to become 
either municipalities or urban districts. Given what these changes in status have 
meant in the past, the acceptance of all or even most of these applications would 
entail fundamental changes in China’s landscape and a quickening of the pace of 
urbanization that could rival even the Jiang era. In view of the great scope of 
the shifts that have already occurred during the reform era, accelerating this 
pace would mean unprecedented social changes.
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Assessing the balance of power in Phase III
The most notable change in the balance of power between central and local 
governments has been one of recentralization. The unusually personal adminis-
tration of Xi Jinping has removed powers and discretion from local govern-
ments, established new forms of monitoring and sanctioning, and frightened 
local officials by throwing thousands into jail. While this has already checked 
many of the excesses of the abuse of power and corruption of office, it has also 
dampened innovation and flexibility. Recentralization is not the only change 
that seems likely to occur. Xi Jinping’s planned urbanization drive may 
strengthen the hand of municipalities, and may resume the transformation of 
rural counties that has been slowed since 2005. Moreover, the envisioned city 
clusters will necessitate new forms of coordination and governance that the 
current administrative hierarchy seems unlikely to provide. Whether this comes 
at the expense of the provinces it is too soon to tell.
Forecasts and conclusions
In 1978, China’s leadership and people, exhausted by the political excesses of 
the Cultural Revolution and decades of largely fruitless attempts at industrializa-
tion through draconian top- down planning, faced enormous challenges. These 
could not be tackled within their existing administrative hierarchy. Decentraliza-
tion – the strengthening of provinces and transforming of prefectures – set con-
ditions for unleashing new energy, innovations, and experimentation. China’s 
economy grew, overseas investment poured into coastal areas, poverty declined 
at a record pace, and China’s neglected infrastructure network expanded 
quickly. Yet just as releasing wild cats in a town infested with mice simultan-
eously solves and raises a problem – the cats chased away the mice, but how do 
we now get rid of the cats? – the accomplishments of that era brought new chal-
lenges. Devolved power was abused; inequality soared; rural areas (after the 
mid- 1980s) were neglected and even exploited; cynicism focusing on the virtues 
of party representatives became pervasive. Decentralization and a virulent 
“urban fever” were linked to these problems. This prompted Hu Jintao to 
address some of the excesses that his predecessors’ policies had produced. As a 
result, the administrative hierarchy adjusted once again, as the administration 
sought to construct a new socialist countryside, check the power of prefecture- 
level municipalities, and slow the urbanization of counties. Yet the surprisingly 
weak Hu Jintao was only partially successful and his administration failed to lay 
down deep institutional roots that would cement these changes in place, let 
alone reverse the drive toward urbanization and industrialization.
 Now a new administration led by Xi Jinping is borrowing from – and doub-
ling down on – Deng and Jiang’s commitment to rapid industrialization and 
urbanization. While firm conclusions are premature, these shifts will surely have 
a major impact on China’s social and political landscape – and may exacerbate 
inequality and other problems that have returned with a vengeance. The Xi 
132  J.A. Donaldson
administration has also adopted and deepened the Hu Jintao administration’s 
recentralization efforts, as Xi Jinping further reins in local power and recentral-
izes control in Beijing. While a degree of central control has proven necessary, 
the extent to which it is being used threatens to stifle the latitude for local gov-
ernment leaders to address local issues by applying central policy flexibly, let 
alone to design and innovate their own policy strategies. These initiatives will 
also have a major impact on China’s administrative hierarchy if counties are 
transferred to cities or urban districts, and as new urban clusters emerge, requir-
ing new forms of trans- provincial governance. Yet, in many ways, even as the 
balance of power has shifted toward the center, the Xi–Li administration has 
adopted the worst of both worlds from the two previous phases. As China enters 
a new era, with newly emerging challenges, the capacity of Xi’s recentralized 
administrative hierarchy to meet those challenges – some of them of its own 
creation – will be tested.
Notes
1 The author wishes to thank Zhanping Hu, Yeling Tan, Weigang Gong, Yane Lee, Yu 
Xun Tan, Seah Yuji, Junhan Toh, and Pearlyn Neo for their help in conducting 
research for this chapter. Thanks are also due to members of the Asian Network for the 
Study of Local China (ANSLoC), particularly Chung Jae Ho, who put energy and 
effort into building the organization. Research for this chapter was supported by a 
grant from the Singapore Ministry of Education Academic Research Fund Tier 2 (Fund 
# MOE2012-T2-2-115).
2 There have been reports of local resistance to Hainan’s development, however, with 
several scholars reporting protests and controversies that emerged among different seg-
ments of the local population. See for example Feng and Goodman (1997).
3 The section of Chongqing that had previously held this status was much smaller and 
did not include many of the counties that were included in the provincial- level unit 
in 1994.
4 For instance, Professor Feng Qiaobin of the China National School of Administration 
made this argument; see Chen (2015).
5 This is the statistic reported when Xi Jinping assumed power at the end of 2014. See 
for example Zhongguo Jijian Jiancha Zazhi (2015).
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